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Parliamentary accountability in multilevel
governance: what role for parliaments in post-crisis
EU economic governance?
Ben Crum
Department of Political Science and Public Administration (FSW), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
How has the new structure of European Union (EU) economic governance
affected the ability of parliaments (national and European) to scrutinize and
control economic policy? Departing from the premise that executive power
needs to be matched by appropriate parliamentary control, this contribution
argues that parliamentary powers have been compromised in EU economic
governance. Although budgetary powers remain formally at the national level,
governments’ decisions have become constrained and national parliaments
find themselves on the losing side of a reinforced two-level game. This loss in
parliamentary powers is not compensated at the European level, as at that
level political authority is effectively left suspended between the national
governments, who are unaccountable as a collective, and the European
Commission, which lacks a political mandate of its own. Against this
background, a final section identifies guidelines for organizing parliamentary
accountability in settings, like EU economic governance, in which executive
power has come to be shared across levels.
KEYWORDS Accountability; democratic deficit; European Parliament; European Semester; parliaments
Introduction
In the steady stream of reports on the future of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) that have appeared in recent years, it has become a
common habit to reserve the final section for the question of democratic
legitimacy (European Commission 2012: Section 4; European Commission
2015b: Section 6; Juncker et al. 2015: Section 5; Van Rompuy et al. 2012:
Section V). These sections tend to remain rather general in character. Typi-
cally, they flag that any steps towards further integration in economic
affairs ‘should go hand-in-hand with greater democratic accountability,
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legitimacy and institutional strengthening’ (Juncker et al. 2015: 17). Then,
slightly more specifically, it is underlined that parliaments – national parlia-
ments and the European Parliament – are to play a key role in this. Here the
‘guiding principle’ is that ‘democratic control and accountability should
occur at the level at which the decisions are taken’ (cf. European Commission
2012: 35; European Parliament 2015b: 12; Van Rompuy et al. 2012: 16). Any
more concrete proposals, however, are limited to increasing the efficiency of
the ways that parliaments are consulted in the European Union’s (EU’s) econ-
omic governance; they stop short of offering parliaments any binding
powers.
This contribution seeks to assess how and to what extent the new struc-
ture of economic governance of the eurozone has affected the ability of
parliaments (national and European) to scrutinize and control economic
policy. It thus follows the reports mentioned in their normative assumption
that parliaments play a key role in ensuring democratic legitimacy and
accountability of economic governance. This assumption is developed in
the next section, which also underlines the distinctive challenges that
emerge once executive power comes to be shared between the national
and the supranational level. Against this normative background, the rest
of the contribution examines the shifts in economic policy-making power
that the new structure of EU economic governance involves and the
forms of parliamentary accountability by which these have been
matched. Thus, this account offers a holistic view of parliamentary account-
ability of EU economic governance at both levels, while previous analyses
tend to focus on the national (Fasone 2015; Jančić 2016) or the suprana-
tional (Fasone 2014) level alone.
In this contribution, I argue that, while the crisis has not led member states
to actually transfer economic competences to the European level, it has led
them to succumb to a much-reinforced system of surveillance. My central
claim is that this system, taken as a whole, undermines parliamentary scrutiny
and control. Although the eventual right to adopt the budget is preserved at
the national level, governments’ economic decisions are increasingly con-
strained and parliaments thus find themselves at the losing side of a
reinforced two-level game. At the same time, this loss in parliamentary
powers is not compensated at the European level, as at that level political
authority is effectively left suspended between the national governments,
who are unaccountable as a collective, and the European Commission,
which lacks a political mandate of its own. In light of this two-level diagnosis,
a final section identifies guidelines for organizing parliamentary accountability
in settings, like the European Semester, in which executive power has come to








































Theorizing parliamentary accountability in multilevel
governance
Parliaments’ role in democratic political systems is generally seen as
embedded in a chain of delegation in which they act as the intermediary
between the electorate and the executive (Strøm 2000). This chain of del-
egation is exemplified in the fact that elections determine the composition
of the parliament and, in parliamentary systems, the composition of parlia-
ment in turn determines the composition of the executive. In between elec-
tions, processes of parliamentary accountability (information provision,
questions, debates, motions etc.) serve to secure that the executive remains
aligned with the preferences of the electorate. Thus, parliamentary account-
ability tracks executive authority.
This understanding of parliamentary accountability relies on a substantial
set of normative presuppositions (cf. Bovens 2007). It posits parliament as
the arena where the exercise of executive power is subject to public justifica-
tion. The metaphor of an ‘arena’ is appropriate here, as the executive does not
only put forward its justifications, but is likely to find its account critically chal-
lenged by alternative accounts from parliament. Depending on the justifica-
tion offered, parliament usually concedes a certain degree of discretion to
the executive. Ultimately, however, the process of parliamentary accountabil-
ity can be understood as staked on the potential of parliament imposing sanc-
tions on the executive, with the removal from office as the ultimate threat.
This model of parliamentary accountability becomes challenged once
states become enmeshed in a multilevel political system like the European
Union (Crum and Curtin 2015). If one insists that member states retain ulti-
mate authority within the multilevel system, then accountability can still be
offloaded in each of the national parliaments involved. This can be called
the ‘intergovernmental model’. Its opposite is the ‘supranational model’ in
which executive authority is effectively delegated to the supranational level
and is accountable to a corresponding supranational parliament, like the Euro-
pean Parliament (EP).
More complex, however, are the in-between situations in which member
states retain a certain level of autonomy but at the same time become con-
strained by supranational norms. In practice, this seems to be the predomi-
nant situation in much of EU policy-making. It is particularly prominent to
the extent that states pool powers among themselves rather than that they
delegate them to a supranational authority (cf. Moravcsik 1998: 67ff.). In
doing so, each government retains its own voice, but is eventually bound
and constrained by the collective will of all the governments together. Typi-
cally, this situation has been addressed by relying on a double-key of parlia-
mentary control, in which European decisions are both directly controlled
by the EP as well as indirectly through the controls that national parliaments







































maintain on their governments in the Council of Ministers. Most importantly,
this applies to the standard legislative procedure of the Union (cf. Article 10(2)
TEU).
Whereas the intergovernmental and the supranational model of parlia-
mentary accountability are rather straightforward, the double-key model
raises important conceptual, normative and practical challenges. These
concern in particular the interrelation between the two channels of represen-
tation (cf. Crum and Fossum 2013). In fact, the famous ‘democratic deficit’ of
the European Union may be understood most concretely as a shortfall in the
capacity of the supranational parliamentary power to compensate for the
reduction of parliamentary powers at the national level (Weiler et al. 1995).
In contrast, Andrew Moravcsik (2012: 66) has submitted that the superimposi-
tion of direct and indirect parliamentary controls actually means that EU
decision-making is marked by a ‘democratic surplus’. In their conclusion to
a recent survey of executive accountability in the EU, Crum and Curtin
(2015: 87) assign some credits to both positions as they assert:
there is a dire need in the EU to align power with responsibility. While it may be
true that at present too many EU actors are held responsible for things they do
not hold power over, it certainly is also true that there are too many actors exer-
cising EU power for which no one can be held appropriately responsible.
It is in light of these different understandings of parliamentary accountability
in the EU that the central question of this contribution – how and to what
extent the new structure of economic governance of the eurozone has
affected the ability of parliaments to scrutinize and control economic policy
– needs to be read. Both understandings share the normative presupposition
that executive power should be matched by parliamentary accountability (cf.
Van Rompuy et al. 2012: 16). The empirical question then becomes whether
the new structure of economic governance has involved a shift in executive
power and, if so, whether that shift has been matched by an appropriate
and effective shift in parliamentary prerogatives at the national and/or the
European level. Furthermore, if executive powers in economic governance
are by now shared between the national and the European level, the case
of the new economic governance in the EU (which is mostly non-legislative
in character) may offer new pointers as to how parliamentary accountability
across the two levels is best co-ordinated.
EU economic governance – before and after the crisis
Ahead of the crisis, the structure of executive power and accountability in EU
economic governance closely resembled the intergovernmental model in
which member states remain the main centres of authority and are accounta-








































macroeconomic policy-making accounts for the well-known asymmetry in the
design of EMU. Member states lost control over their exchange rate and much
of their ability to manipulate interest rates was moved to the European Central
Bank (ECB). However, a complete harmonization of financial and economic
policies was considered unnecessary. All that was provided for was the Stab-
ility and Growth Pact (SGP) (Heipertz and Verdun 2010), which defined a few
parameters within which the public finances of the eurozone countries were
to operate, most importantly a maximum cap on the budget deficit of 3 per
cent of gross domestic product (GDP). At the same time, supranational
powers in economic governance were limited and severely constrained. The
European Commission was tasked with monitoring the economic perform-
ance of the member states, but its powers remained subject to the political
instructions and approval of the national governments (Savage and
Howarth 2017).
Obviously, this structure of governance was severely shaken up as the
financial crisis erupted in late 2008 and gradually morphed into a sovereign
debt crisis in the eurozone. Beyond the bail-outs of individual governments
and the adoption of new treaties, the most structural EU policy response to
the euro crisis has been the build-up of the European Semester. Essentially,
the European Semester involves the systematic reviewing of national
budget plans and economic outlooks by the EU in the spring (semester)
ahead of their formal adoption in the autumn. As such, the European Seme-
ster builds upon the multilateral surveillance of economic policies as it
already took place before the crisis through the SGP and the Broad Economic
Policy Guidelines.
Through a number of EU laws (the so-called ‘Six-Pack’ and ‘Two-Pack’),
macroeconomic surveillance has been stepped up (cf. Verdun and Zeitlin
2017). For one, with the addition of a Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure
(MIP), the scope of European surveillance has been broadened beyond
public finance to also include macroeconomic indicators (e.g., about private
debt, liabilities in the financial sector and unemployment). The most visible
feature of the European Semester is that it harmonizes the different review
procedures in a single co-ordinated calendar. This yearly cycle is organized
around several milestones: the publication of the Annual Growth Survey by
the Commission in November; the adoption of economic priorities by the
March European Council; the submission of financial and economic plans
by the governments in April; following which the Commission prepares the
Country-Specific Recommendations, which get their eventual political endor-
sement by the European Council in June. Furthermore, the sanction potential
of the procedure is increased by providing that, rather than that Commission
recommendations require a qualified majority in the Council to be adopted,
they now stand unless there is a qualified majority to reject or amend them.1







































Crucially, the European Semester is set up as a dialogical process in which
the national policy plans are held up against pan-European guidelines but also
these guidelines (as for instance contained in the Annual Growth Strategy and
the policy guidelines of the European Council) are supposed to adjust reflex-
ively. However, while much of this process can be characterized as ‘soft policy’,
ultimately there remains the threat of penalties. While no financial sanctions
have been imposed so far, the more direct threat that countries face is the
prospect of more intensive policy scrutiny and ever more detailed prescrip-
tions. Thus, Iain Begg (2013: 60) has aptly characterized the new EU economic
governance as ‘a system that relies primarily on deterrence’.
The implications that the reforms of EU economic governance have had for
the locus and strength of executive power in the Union are severely contested
(Schmidt 2016a). On the one hand, there are the advocates of the ‘new inter-
governmentalism’ (Bickerton et al. 2015; Fabbrini 2016), who highlight that
member states’ main responses to crises in the EU have involved intensifying
the deliberation and co-ordination among themselves rather than expanding
the scope of the Community method and the institutions associated with it
(the Commission and the EP). On the other hand, we find proponents of
the ‘new supranationalism’ who submit that supranational institutions, like
the ECB and the Commission, have seen a significant expansion of their
powers and scope of action (Bauer and Becker 2014; Dehousse 2016).
These two positions may not be as mutually exclusive as is suggested
(Schmidt 2016a). It is quite likely that, if the euro crisis has fed a greater cen-
tralization of economic governance in the EU, this is reflected in both the
intergovernmental and the supranational institutions. However, the question
of this contribution is more specific than the question of who has gained
power, as it rather asks about executive authority and its accountability to par-
liament. This is the focus of the more detailed analysis of the following two
sections, in which we first look at the relevant changes at the national level
and then turn to the European level.
Sidelining national parliaments: a reinforced two-level game
Formally, the reforms adopted since the crisis have left the primacy of national
policy-making in fiscal affairs intact. Above all, this is reflected by the fact that,
regardless of all surveillance measures, the final approval of the budget
remains in the hands of the national authorities. And while surveillance
powers at the supranational level have been increased, member states have
been very reluctant to delegate effective decision-power and retain the possi-
bility to reverse the Commission’s decisions (cf. Schmidt 2015: 99ff.).
Yet there is no denying that governments’ fiscal policies have become
more constrained (Scharpf 2011). Supranational surveillance has expanded








































constraining influence is very much an effect of the way it has been
sequenced. The early start of the European Semester, in the final months of
the year preceding the year in which the budget is adopted, means that
the European level takes the lead in defining the main policy orientations
as well as the scope for national discretion. It is European-level decisions
like the Annual Growth Survey, the economic priorities and the Country-
Specific Recommendations that set the overarching policy framework. Thus,
the supranational constellation of the European Semester pushes govern-
ments in a reactive and defensive mode.
Consequently, the effect of the European Semester on the ability of
national parliaments to scrutinize their governments’ economic policy
choices emerges as a reinforced ‘two-level game’ (cf. Benz 2013). Robert
Putnam (1988) originally adopted the metaphor of a ‘two-level game’ to
analyse the ways in which governments in international negotiations must
navigate between two arenas, that of the international negotiation table
and that of the domestic constituency represented by the national parliament.
Putnam suggests that governments can use their privileged access to, and
knowledge of, one level to increase their leverage at the other. By manoeuvr-
ing smartly between the two levels, governments can maximize their standing
in the international negotiations while also gaining autonomy from their
national constituency.
The European Semester has certainly not strengthened governments’
powers. Instead, the qualification of a reinforced two-level game underlines
that the Semester has very much tilted the balance of the fiscal two-level
game to the supranational level. As governments find their economic policies
conditioned by supranational targets and recommendations, their ability to
respond to any wishes from their national parliament has become
constrained.
Interestingly, however, the very reinforcement of the European reins on
national budgets and fiscal policy has provoked an active response among
many national parliaments (Fasone 2015; Jančić 2016). Many have used the
European Semester to increase their consultation rights in the early stages
of budget preparation and on the broader financial and economic frameworks
that govern the budgetary process. By 2013, the vast majority of national par-
liaments in the EU discussed the Stability and Convergence Programmes and
the National Reform Programmes that their governments submitted to the
Commission (COSAC 2014: 42).
For sure, there is considerable variation in the ways national parliaments
have responded to the European Semester. Hallerberg et al. (2017) find that
it is not in the Euro area but rather in the Eurosceptic countries that are unli-
kely to ever adopt the euro (the United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary, Denmark
and the Czech Republic) where parliaments are most active in discussing their
governments’ plans. The scattered evidence on the depth of parliamentary







































powers (COSAC 2014; European Parliament 2014) suggests furthermore that it
is the Nordic parliaments (Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Estonia), with a tradition
of active EU scrutiny (Winzen 2012), where parliaments retain most powers
over the government’s exchange with the Commission. Beyond Northern
Europe, the best-known case is probably the German Bundestag whose bud-
getary authority has been upheld and reinforced by the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court (Hoïng 2015). Also, the traditionally much weaker French
Assemblée Nationale has seen its involvement in the budgetary process
expanded (Jančić 2016: 243). Notably, even parliaments in Mediterranean
countries like Italy, Spain and Portugal who have found themselves under
severe budgetary pressures have been remarkably assertive in extending
their involvement in the budgetary process (Fasone 2015: 20f.; Jančić 2016:
242f.). Still, as Jančić (2016: 225) concludes, on the whole these parliamentary
initiatives ‘do not outweigh the centralization of the nascent EU fiscal regime’
and ‘are unlikely substantially to influence EMU policy-making processes’.
In fact, national parliaments display a keen awareness of the limits of their
span of control. Most of them are content to be involved in processes of con-
sultation and deliberation with the government without any direct veto powers.
Notably, some national parliaments (like the Austrian chambers [COSAC 2014:
43/4]) only get to discuss the government’s Stability and Convergence Plans
after they have already been sent to the European Commission. Other parlia-
ments, like in the Benelux countries, do debate the plans before they are
sent off, but have no powers to reject or amend them (European Parliament
2014: 2). Even the Danish Folketinget (2013), which (as so often) was a frontrun-
ner in adapting to the European Semester, declined to claim a veto over its gov-
ernment’s input into the European Semester. In the end, in a survey in 2014, the
European Parliament (2014: 2) found that only the Latvian Saeima has the
power to approve and to amend the Stability and Convergence Programme.
Thus, we find that many parliaments have responded to the European
Semester by expanding their scrutiny over the national budget, but that
they do so only in the lower ranges of accountability mechanisms (infor-
mation, consultation and debate). When it comes to the substance of the
budget, national parliaments tend to cave in as they recognize the Semester
as a reinforced two-level game, part of which takes place beyond their span of
control. This recognition of economic interdependence in the EU may be
regarded as ‘a sign of responsibility from the legislatures’ (Fasone 2015: 26).
Still, it inevitably also means that they recognize their powers to scrutinize
and control economic policy to be limited (Laffan 2014). Indeed, the recog-
nition that the European Semester transcends the powers of national parlia-
ments motivates calls for reinforced parliamentary scrutiny at the European
level (COSAC 2014: 47f.). Hence, we logically turn to the European Parliament








































Sidelining the European Parliament: the suspension of
supranational political authority
While the European Parliament (EP) has had an important role in the legal
establishment of the European Semester, it plays a remarkably marginal
role in its actual execution (Fasone 2014; Schmidt 2015: 111). All the European
Semester provides for is the ‘economic dialogue’ that the EP maintains with
the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, the (rotating) President
of the Council and the Eurogroup President. Notably, however, these
exchanges are mostly informative and consultative in character, and place
the EP in a rather passive, receptive position.
This marginal position of the EP can be justified on the basis of the general
principle, already cited in the introduction, that ‘democratic control and
accountability should occur at the level at which the decisions are taken’
(Van Rompuy et al. 2012: 16). The presumption is then that the European
Semester involves very few binding decisions that are adopted at the supra-
national level. What is more, as the Semester is an iterative process that moves
to its conclusions in a step-by-step fashion, it is very hard to determine the
decisive, political moment; at every stage it is possible for the actors involved
to refer to the preceding step as conditioning their options. In the words of
Mark Dawson (2015: 982): ‘Decision-making never crystallizes … into a
“once and for all” agreement but acts as an ongoing series of open-ended
“decisions”’. This situation is complicated further by the fact that the European
Semester mixes general decisions with country-specific ones, and that these
relate to different audiences. In the early phases of the Semester, the pan-
EU frameworks are adopted, most notably the Annual Growth Survey and
the economic priorities of the European Council, that offer strategic orien-
tations but have no immediate effect. Nevertheless, they condition the sub-
sequent assessments of the national and financial plans, but these are less
suitable for supranational scrutiny as they relate to individual countries.
Regardless of the formal status of the positions adopted at the suprana-
tional level, they are certainly consequential, especially once one recognizes
that, even if actual sanctions are unlikely to materialize, the Semester operates
mainly through deterrence (Begg 2013: 60). Then, however, the big issue from
a viewpoint of parliamentary accountability is that the structure of the Euro-
pean Semester makes it very difficult to determine the locus of political auth-
ority at the supranational level (cf. Crum and Curtin 2015: 82f.): while the
governments, who are formally responsible, cannot be held accountable as
a collective, the Commission that calls most shots in practice operates
under the pretence that these are merely administrative decisions. As a con-
sequence, no one is accountable.
For sure, in principle, political authority resides with the member govern-
ments. However, the national governments cannot themselves execute the







































actual supervision of each other’s financial and economic policies, as they
want to maintain the political neutrality of the process (Savage and
Howarth 2017). Hence, the logical solution is to delegate the administration
of macroeconomic surveillance to a technical authority, the European Com-
mission (Dehousse 2016: 626).
Indeed, in many respects the European Semester appears to give a particu-
larly strong role to the European Commission, in particular because it is pri-
marily responsible for drafting the recommendations (Bauer and Becker
2014; Dehousse 2016). However, the Commission is not a political institution
in its own right; it is to promote ‘the general interest of the Union’ rather than
that it holds a political mandate, its members are appointed rather than
elected, and it exercises executive tasks that have been delegated to it by
the Council and the EP. The formal primacy of the member states remains
reflected in the fact that once the Commission has drafted its Country-Specific
Recommendations, they still need the final endorsement of the Council and
can, in principle, be recalled, albeit only by a qualified majority.
Since the Commission cannot claim a political mandate of its own, its
decisions are guided by rules and benchmarks (Schmidt 2015). The most
famous example is the original rule in the SGP that precluded EU govern-
ments from running a deficit above 3 per cent of their GDP. Further relevant
priorities and benchmarks are laid down in the MIP, the Annual Growth
Survey, and in the economic priorities adopted by the European Council. As
the European Commission (e.g., 2015a: 4) itself is keen to underline, the credi-
bility of the SGP requires it to operate as a ‘rules-based system’, which fore-
closes the possibility that the Commission exercises any political judgment
for which it has not been authorized.
However, this rules-based understanding of the Commission’s assessments
is difficult to sustain in practice (Schmidt 2016b). This is evident in the set-up
of the MIP where the ‘alert thresholds’ on the headline indicators do not auto-
matically trigger a policy response but only serve a signalling function, which
invites a closer and more holistic review of the relevant economic conditions
and the threat they pose for other European economies. But also regarding
the SGP, the European Commission has come to a more contextual appraisal
of national performance. Step-by-step, the strict 3 per cent norm has been
abandoned in favour of a ‘Medium-Term Objective’ (MTO) for each member
state that defines the desired path of budgetary adjustment over time
(cf. Mabbett and Schelkle 2016: 133/4). Indeed, by the Commission’s own
admission, some flexibility is indispensable in the way it executes its
assessments:
It is on purpose that the Pact envisages flexibility in the way its rules should be
applied, both over time and across countries. It is also on purpose that some dis-








































assess the soundness of public finances in the light of country-specific circum-
stances, in order to recommend the best course of action based on the latest
developments and information. (European Commission 2015a: 4)
Vivien Schmidt (2016b) aptly characterizes this shifting position of the Com-
mission as involving a reinterpretation of the rules ‘by stealth’.
However, the recognition of the indispensability of context-sensitive
judgments exposes a gap in supranational political authorization, as with
this sphere of discretion the Commission inevitably moves beyond the
instructions from the Council (cf. Dawson 2015; Schmidt 2015: 99). In prac-
tice, the two institutions aim to play down the ‘disjunction between dis-
course and action’ (Schmidt 2016b: 1033). The Commission threads
cautiously in issuing its recommendations and seeks to anticipate as much
as possible the will of the (majority of the) member states. In turn, the
member states have actually been quite happy to leave the lead to the Com-
mission and to adopt its proposals as a rallying point. Typically, even when it
comes to the adoption of the political priorities at the March European
Council, the Heads of Government tend to simply endorse the priorities of
the Commission’s Annual Growth Survey rather than to formulate their
own (e.g., European Council 2016: 3).
All in all, it is undeniable that the European Semester involves the making
of political judgments at the European level, which are consequential in that
they constrain member states’ financial and economic decisions and are
backed up by close surveillance and, ultimately, the threat of financial sanc-
tions. Naturally, these political judgments should be subject to parliamentary
control. However, while an extensive web of economic dialogue has devel-
oped at the European level, any effective powers to intervene have been with-
held from the EP. The deeper problem is that it is not clear who should be held
accountable because the locus of supranational political authority has been
left suspended. The Commission lacks a political mandate of its own and
hence presents all its decisions as mere executions of the rules set by the
member states (often with endorsement of the EP). The member states are
not politically accountable as a collective at the European level and, in the
absence of a coherent political orientation of themselves, tend to rally
behind the positions adopted by the Commission.
(Re)parliamentarizing EU economic governance
Having reviewed parliamentary powers in the European Semester at the
national and the European level, the apparent logic of the ‘guiding principle’
that ‘democratic control and accountability should occur at the level at which
the decisions are taken’ (Van Rompuy et al. 2012: 16) turns out to be rather
deceptive. Formally, it can be maintained that the ultimate decision power







































in economic and budgetary affairs remains at the national level, and hence no
binding parliamentary powers are necessary at the supranational level. Yet, in
practice, decisions at the national level have become more constrained, while
the relevant decisions at the supranational are taken without it being clear
who can be held accountable.
The central challenge, then, is whether it is possible to insert political
responsibility and accountability into the kind of straddled decision-making
structure to which the new economic governance in Europe has given rise.
Following on the preceding analyses, four aspects in particular can be ident-
ified that can help to ensure that the shift in decision-making power in econ-
omic governance that the European Semester involves is met by an
appropriate structure of parliamentary control: marking the political
moment; embodying political authority; increasing the credibility of the EP;
and reinforcing the capacities of national parliaments.
Marking the political moment
Before all else, it is essential to identify the key political moments in the itera-
tive process of the European Semester. In principle, the critical political
moment at the European level is the setting of the economic priorities by
the March European Council. This is the moment for the member states to
claim political control over the process and adjust the priorities depending
on their appreciation of the political and economic conditions. What is
more, the more the member states elaborate a substantial economic
agenda, the less the Commission has to rely on automatic rules and bench-
marks in drafting the subsequent policy recommendations.
However, as noted, governments have been reluctant to claim the March
European Council as the moment to have a genuine political debate about
the economic priorities for Europe. This unwillingness may be explained by
the ideological differences within the European Council, which complicates
the elaboration of any substantial collective economic strategy. Still, also
among the governments (cf. Governo Italiano 2016), there are signs of
growing frustration with the lack of a substantial and coherent political
stance.
Apart from political will, one thing that can help to turn the March Euro-
pean Council into a genuine political moment would be for it to reduce the
influence of the Commission’s Annual Growth Strategy and to rather invite
collectively discussed strategic agendas from the relevant sectoral Councils
(i.e., the Councils for Economic and Financial Affairs [Ecofin] and for Employ-
ment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs [EPSCO]). The elaboration of
more political agendas for the European Semester would also serve as useful










































As a complement to the marking of the political moment, for accountability to
take place it is essential that political responsibility becomes embodied in
some way. Even if the collective political authority of the member states is
maintained, there is a need for a proper interlocutor at the European level,
who can speak on their behalf and offer public justification of the decisions
that the Council adopts, as well as of the ways these are administered. The
typical way in which the EU has resolved this kind of situation is by
‘double-hatting’ executive responsibility between the Council and the Com-
mission, the prime example being the High Representative for the Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy (FASP), who is at the same time Vice-President of
the European Commission.
Hence, one might envisage the establishment of a ‘High Representative’ for
Economic Affairs who can both act as a special agent of the Council and draw
on the Commission’s administrative resources (cf. Enderlein and Haas 2015).
Thus positioned, such a High Representative would play a critical role in recon-
ciling the policy assessments of the Commission with the political backing of
the member states. As the example of the High Representative for the FASP
illustrates, such a supranational agent remains tied to the mandate that she
is given by the national governments. Still, she can be an important policy
entrepreneur and agenda setter in moving initiatives forward and in adopting
positions that the governments left to themselves would be unlikely to speak
out on. Crucially, for our purpose, such a High Representative could also act as
a spokesperson for the EU’s economic policy and offer justifications for it
before the public and the parliament. Indeed, as a member of the Commission
she would be subject to all the scrutiny powers that the EP commands.
Increasing the credibility of the European Parliament
The two preceding steps are actually preconditions for granting the EP more
substantial powers in the European Semester. At present, the rights that the
EP can claim in the context of the ‘economic dialogue’ are procedural in char-
acter: the right to be informed and to give advice. Notably, the 2015 Five Pre-
sidents’ Report (Juncker et al. 2015: 17) suggests that Commissioners could
appear more systematically before the EP, and that they and Council repre-
sentatives could participate more regularly in interparliamentary meetings.
However, if we take it that ultimate political authority in economic affairs
remains with the member states, then the Council rather than the Commis-
sion should be the EP’s primary port of call. Here the establishment of a
High Representative who can speak on behalf of the Council would be of
much help in establishing a rapport between the Council and the EP. What
is more, once the European Council takes greater political responsibility for







































the policy priorities, the EP might be given the right to consent to these pri-
orities, possibly through a process of joint decision-making between the
Council and the EP modelled on existing conciliation practices (cf. the Euro-
pean Parliament’s [2015: 13] own proposal for so-called ‘Convergence
Guidelines’).
Inevitably, such steps will bring more politics to the process and reduce its
rule-based character. This creates space to set political priorities and to adjust
‘alert levels’, certainly in the context of the MIP. Also, the flexibility that is now
apparent in the interpretation of the SGP would then become subject to
public debate, in which all too self-serving interpretations by the member
states would need to be balanced by the other members, by the prudence
of the Commission and by the political assessment of the EP.
Reinforcing the capacities of national parliaments
Clearly, however, as long as budgetary competences are ultimately exercised
at the national level, national parliaments continue to fulfil key scrutiny roles.
As indicated, many national parliaments have been remarkably active in
responding to the new structure of EU economic governance. Still, most par-
liaments seem to be reluctant to directly interfere in the exchange between
their government and the European Commission. This creates exactly the con-
ditions under which the government can insist that its hand is forced by
supranational imperatives.
Hence, if national parliaments want to retain their standing in economic
affairs, they need to adopt a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, depend-
ing on the constitutional conditions they face, they can maximize their invol-
vement in the drawing up of the stability and reform national programmes in
early spring. For that involvement to have any impact, one would expect them
to be involved before the actual submission of the programmes rather than
only after it (cf. Hallerberg et al. 2017; Kreilinger 2016: 32). Ideally, one
would even want the programmes to be subject to parliamentary approval,
as is already the case in some countries.
On the other hand, it is essential for national parliaments to increase their
awareness of and their access to the supranational level. For that, the Interpar-
liamentary Conference on Economic Governance is the natural channel. While
this conference has so far disappointed as a forum for substantial political
engagement (Cooper 2016; Kreilinger 2015), a more visible political framing
of the European Semester – as aimed for by the preceding proposals –
should serve to increase the stakes of these European exchanges. It should
also encourage national parliamentarians to co-ordinate their input at the
national level with the political priorities debated at the European level.
What is more, the Interparliamentary Conference should serve to exchange








































co-ordinate, wherever possible, political interventions across parliaments (cf.
Crum and Fossum 2013).
Obviously, more involvement and awareness of national parliaments will
mean that the rules and benchmarks propagated by Brussels will be less
taken for granted and subject to greater politicization. Political contestation
may well decrease compliance with the Country-Specific Recommendations.
However, if such non-compliance is accompanied by a process of political
exchange between the national and European level, it is actually in line
with the dialogical character that the European Semester is supposed to
have. Thus, greater non-compliance with Country-Specific Recommendations
may well be the price to pay for the longer-term legitimacy of the European
Semester as a process.
Conclusion
As key national competences become ever more closely co-ordinated at the
supranational level, this creates a major challenge for parliamentary account-
ability. Accountability does not only require that decision-making capacity is
matched by adequate parliamentary controls at each level; it also requires
taking account of the peculiar ways in which the decision-making processes
at the two levels interact. Thus, parliamentary accountability turns out to be
particularly vulnerable in a multilevel setting, as its demands at each level
may be met by a reference to the constraints at the other.
Concretely, we find that as the experience of the Euro crisis has led
national economic policies to become incorporated in a dense web of Euro-
pean surveillance, the capacity of national parliaments to scrutinize the
choices of their governments has become severely strained. At the same
time, no effective parliamentary accountability has developed at the Euro-
pean level; at that level, political authority remains suspended between
the collective of national governments and the (quasi-)technocratic assess-
ments by the Commission, leaving the EP without any authority to hold to
account.
A crucial precondition for parliamentary accountability to operate effec-
tively in such a multilevel context is that executive authority can be attrib-
uted to a well-specified executive actor. Hence, it is of particular importance
in an iterative process like the European Semester that the key political
moments are properly marked and that at the European level a political
authority is established who can be held answerable for the decisions
adopted. Only with these conditions in place can the EP claim a more sub-
stantial and consequential role in the process. At the same time, a better
readability of the supranational political process can also complement the
efforts of national parliaments to engage effectively and to co-ordinate
their interventions.







































Naturally, effective parliamentary accountability of the European Semester
will expose the political choices made to greater contestation and reduce the
reliance on rules and benchmarks. While such a shift may indeed reduce
member state compliance with the Country-Specific Recommendations, it
will reinforce the character of the European Semester as a dialogical
process rather than a hierarchical one. At the same time, increasing parliamen-
tary accountability across levels need not necessarily increase the centrifugal
tendencies. On the contrary, considered as a package, the suggested guide-
lines require parliaments to co-ordinate their activities among each other
and to more consistently perceive their own role within the broader
context of the multilevel system of EU governance as a whole. In that
sense, greater parliamentary accountability should eventually contribute to
the collective ownership of the European Semester.
Note
1. The one exception in this regard is the launch of an excessive imbalance pro-
cedure under the MIP, which requires the usual qualified majority in the Council.
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